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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
CLINT KETCHUM,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.

vs.

12516

BONN H. LYON,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
The plaintiff sold shares of stock to defendant
and after ten years demanded their return for the
original price and the defendant refused. Plaintiff
filed the suit below to recover the shares.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Trial Judge Merrill C. Faux adjudged plaintiff
to be the owner of the stock and ordered the shares
delivered to plaintiff appellee upon payment of
$86.00.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant appellant asks this Court to re\'e1·se the trial Judge, remand the case with instructions to adjudge the defendant appellant the owner
1

of the stock, and to dismiss the plaintiff appellee's
Complaint with prejudice and upon the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 8th of March, 1961 Clint Ketchum (plaintiff Respondent) and Bonn H. Lyon (defendent appellant) entered into a transaction relating to share of stock in Turner Uranium Corporation.
A day or two before the transaction, the subject
of this lawsuit (TR 12 TR 2a) Ketchum telephonecl
Lyon and asked that Lyon visit him at his room at the
l\Ioxum Hotel.
In compliance with Ketchum's request Lyon saw
him at the hotel. Ketchum said he needed $50.00 and
Lyon said he couldn't loan it to him. (Tr 27, 28). It
was then an·anged that Ketchum would transfe1·
shares in Tu1·ne1· U1·anium Corporation to Lyon for
the $50.00 he needed.
Lyon prepared a document on Hotel stationery
(Ex. Pl) listing the certificates and thei1· amounts.
Ketchum endorse<l the certificates in blank, received
and acknowledged receipt of $50.00, and delivererl
the shares to Lyon. (Tr 28, 29).
The certificates had been issued in the name of
Ketchum in 1954 but had remained in the possession
of the officers of the Company and were in the possession of Lyon as company president at the time
Ketchum endorsed them. (Tr. 30, 31)
No contact was had between Ketchum and Lyon

\Vi th

respec:t to these shares from lVIarch 8, 1961 until
January, 1970 when Ketchum telephone Lyon and
said he would pay $50.00 and interest and wanted
the sha1·es of stock.
Afte1· two telephone conversations Lyon informed Ketchum he owned the stock certificates and would
not clelive1· them, (Tr. 30) and this lawsuit ensued.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE Tf{ANSACTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES \VAS A SALE BY PLAINTIFF TO DEFENDANT AND THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD
HA VE ADJUGED THE DEFENDANT APPELANT THE OWNER OF THE SHARES.

The defendant and appellant, Lyon, contends
the transaction related in the statement of facts was
a sale, which passed title to him; and that the plaintiff and respondent, Ketchum, did not have a cause
of action for the recovery of the shares of stock.
In the first place, the shares were endorsed by
Ketchum in blank and without any limitation, qualification, or condition, as evidenced by the copies of the
shares themselves (Ex. 2-D).
There was prepared at the time of the transaction a document (Ex. 1-P) in the nature of a memorandum describing the shares, and on which Ketchum acknowledged receipt of the purchase price.
Nothing appeared on that document, at the time
3

it was drawn, ( T1·. 12) which indicated any amount
of interest, or any elate upon which repayment was
to be made, (if it was a loan) ; or when, for non-payment, Ketchum would have forfeited title to the
shares of stock.
This was made clear by the ad di ti on al finding
of fact which the trial judge made pursuant to defendant and appellant's motion (R 41-45).
Ketchum admitted he endorsed the certificates
(Tr. 18) and that he signed exhibit 1-P (Tr. 17) but
he closen't remember anything eles. Nowhere in Ketchum's testimony does he say anything about a pledge
of stock or any rate of inte1·est or of a time fm· repay-ment.
It is clear, therefore, f1·om the document 1-P and

from Ketchum's testimony that the conditions he asserts to support his lawsuit do not exist.
In adcli ti on to the foregoing it is important to
note that from March 8, 1961 until January of 1970
nothing was said about the stock by either of the parties to the other.
Nine years elapsed before Ketchum came f01·ward with his notion that he had only borrowed
money, and pledged the stock. Nothing in the testimony, exhibits or the conduct of the parties supports
that position.
70A-8-308, Utah Code Ann. provides in part as
follows:
4

" ( 1) An endorsement of a security in
registered form is made when an appropriate
person signs on it or on a separate document
as assignment or transfer of the security or
power to assign or transfer it or when the signature of such person is written without more
upon the back of the security."
The facts reflected by the record show that an
app1·opl'iate party, namely the owner Ketchum, endorsed the shares in blank ( D-2), delivered them to
Lyon, and receipted for the purchase price. An outright sale of the share of stock by Ketchum to Lyon
was then completed.
POINT II.
THE CLAIM OF THE PLAINTIFF IF LEGAL
IX NATURE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.

The appellant is convinced that, as argued unde1· Point I, there was a sale and respondent didn't
ha\Te a cause of action.
However, if he had a legal cause, it is barred by
the statute of limitation (78-12-23, 78-12-25 Utah
Code Ann.).
If the i·espondent, Ketchum, depends upon exhibit 1-P it would be barred by 78-12-23 UCA. If he
i·elies on his pu1·ported recollection of the transaction,
(which is so vague as to be nonexistent) it would be
ban·ed by 78-12-25. If Ketchum's version of the arrangements were to be accpted, or believed, had he
suddenly come into some money, he could have ten5

clered the money and retrived his stock the next clay
after he endorsed and delivered it. Or he could have
done so at any time thereafter until an action based
on tender to Lyon was barred by one of the two statutory sections referred to.
He did not make any effort nor overture to do so
until nine years had elapsed. His action is barred
and does on lie.
In this connection it should be considered that
Ketchum's complaint alleges that the so-called loan
of $50.00 "was to be payable on demand." If there
had been any such arrangement Lyon could have
made demand for repayment the next day after he
paid Ketchum the money and received the endorsed
shares.
If Ketchum, according to his pleaded version,
as distinguished from his testimony, had failed to
pay Lyon could have then sold the stock to reco\'er
his money.
POINT III
THE CLAIM OF THE PLAINTIFF IF EQUITABLE IN NATURE IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES.

If the respondent, Ketchum, relies on some sort
of equitable doctrine to support his claim, which is
not apparent from the pleading, the appellant maintains that his failure timely to assert it bars it because of laches.
It is scarcely necessary to define for this court
6

the docti·ine of laches. It is an elementary doctrine
that a court of equity declines to exert its powers to
relive one who has been guilty of laches. (Penn Mutnal Life Ins. Co. vs. Austin, 168 U.S. 685 52 LED
026).

In view of the trial judge's concern with the
lapse of time as indicated in his observations from
the bench, to which more detailed reference will be
made, this observation by the Supreme Court of Oregon in ll,fclver vs. Nornian, 213P2d144, is pertenent.
"\Vhen a suit is brought within the time
fixed by an analogous statute of limitations
the burden is on the defendant to show existence of facts amounting to laches, but if suit
is brought afte1· the statutory time the plaintiff must plead and prove that laches does not
exist."
A late1· observation of the Oregon court in Hag,<!('J'f.IJ vs. Nobles, 419 P.2d 9, is also applicable.
"General statutes of limitation do not control suits in equity with the same strictness
that they do at law, but they are adopted by
analogy by courts of equity."
Clearly from the evidence in this record the respondent did not bring his action within the statute
of limitations. He did not plead, nor was any evidence
offered to excuse or explain his delay of almost a decade in doing anything at all about the transaction
with the appellant.
The colloquy between court and counsel at the
7

conclusion of the testimony should be of interest to
this court.
Tl'ial judge said ( Tr. 31) that the plaintiff has
the burden of p1·oof that what transpired was a security transaction and not a sale.
Then the trial judge observed that there was
long delay in asserting his, Ketchum's claim, and said
". . . There are circumstances evidence - one circumstance bearing against the plaintiff's ocntention,
this long delay." (Tr. 32).
The judge then said there was a delay on the part
of the appellant, Lyon, because he did not have the
stock transferred to his name on the books of the
company. (Tr. 32).
It was called to the attention of the trial judge
that there was no evidence that it had been transfe1·ed, or had not. (Tr. 32).

The judge then said that he would consider as
'circumstantial evidence" not withstanding the total
lack of evidence with respect to his assumption. (Tr.
33).
A notation on exhibit 1-P is interpreted by the
judge to be a calculation of interest for nine years
at 8 Sc, (Tr. 34) , even though it is clear from the testimony that these figures were not on the document
when it (1-P) was signed by Ketchum.
1

It was called to the attention of the judge that
8

t1·ansfer was necessary and that if it were a pledge
of the stock by Ketchum, he had no reason to endorse
the shares, or that he could have endorsed them specially.
110

Then the court says in effect (Tr. 35) that if
Ketchum let a loan go by for ten (10) years without
paying interest or, "without making any indication
on it whatever, that he wants the stock back - that
he is ready to pay - without some explanation, is
some evidence that it was a sale." (Tr. 35). This was
the evidence before him.
Then the trial judge said if it ware a sale why
didn't Lyon transfer the stock (Tr. 33). With respect
to this retorical question, it should be noted there was
no evidence before him at all. He simply made this
pe1·sonal assumption.
It was argued for the appellant Lyon that the
respondent Ketchum had not born the burden of proof
that the transfer in question was a pledge and not a
sale.

The court with respect to appellant's contention
continued as follows "I have ... I have a problem;
the circumstances seem to offset each other. In that
event the plaintiff has not borne the burden of proof
which is required of him." (Tr. 40).
In review of the trial judge's conversation with
counsel and his "thinking out loud" about what was
before him he presented persuasive arguments for
9

finding that this was a sale of stock. He then ref used
to be convinced by his logical support for the appellant's position and reached what appellant claims was
an erroneous i·esult.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that this case should be reversed

and demanded with instructions to the trial judge to
adjudge the defendant appellant the owner of the
stock, the subject of this lawsuit.
Re specif ully submitted,
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR.
1010 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for

DPfendant lind Appellant
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